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Remuneration report


Plan provisions

Performance conditions for grants of awards to be made under the Performance Share Plan and the Share Matching Plan in 2008 are detailed below. Performance conditions for grants of awards made prior to 2008 are detailed on Directors' interests page.

Performance Share Plan (PSP)
Key features for PSP awards in 2008:

  • half the PSP award will be based on a Total Shareholder Return performance condition (PSPTSR) and the other half on an Earnings per Share (PSPEPS)* performance condition; and
  • length of period for performance condition: three years with any shares vesting paid out in three equal tranches on vesting* at the end of years three, four and five.

* The PSPEPS award for executive directors is subject to shareholder approval at the May 2008 AGM and, subject to that approval, will have a slightly shorter vesting period so that it vests at the same time as the 2008 PSPTSR award.

For the US executives, the awards are automatically delivered at the end of years three, four and five, subject to the performance condition achieved.

  • Shares under award attract dividends prior to vesting.

Performance Condition – PSPEPS

  • Proportion of the award capable of exercise: determined by the rate of annual actual EPS growth over the three-year performance period, with nil vesting at annual actual EPS growth of 5% or less and 100% vesting at 11% growth as set out below:
  • Rationale for performance measure: major investors consider EPS to be a key indicator of long-term financial performance and value creation.

Performance Condition – PSPTSR

  • Proportion of the award capable of exercise determined by:

(i) the Company’s TSR (share price growth plus dividends) ranking relative to a comparator group of 18 other international defence and aerospace companies (see table below):

PSPTSR – sectoral peer group
Boeing General Dynamics Raytheon
Cobham GKN Rockwell Collins
Dassault Aviation Goodrich Rolls-Royce
EADS Honeywell International Smiths Group
Embraer PN Lockheed Martin Thales
Finmeccanica Northrop Grumman United Technologies
  • nil vesting if the Company’s TSR is outside the top 50% of TSRs achieved by the sectoral comparator group and 100% vesting if it is in the top quintile (ie top 20%) as set out below:

and

(ii) whether there has been a sustained improvement in the Company’s underlying financial performance and whether it is appropriate to release some or all of the awards. In taking such a view, the Committee may consider (but not exclusively) the following financial metrics: net cash/debt; EBITA; order book; turnover; risk and underlying project performance.

  • Rationale for performance measures: importance to major investors as an indication of both earnings and capital growth relative to other major companies in the same sector and to ensure that awards only vest if there has been a clear improvement in the Company’s performance over the relevant period.

Performance of outstanding PSP awards

The graph above summarises the position for all outstanding awards under the PSP as at 31 December 2007. The coloured box shows the range of TSR required for 25% vesting to full vesting, and the square shows BAE Systems’ TSR.

Share Matching Plan (SMP)
Key features for grants of awards in 2008 and 2009:

  • stand-alone share investment plan with the investment linked to the bonus awarded under the Annual Bonus Plan;
  • participants are granted a conditional award of Matching Shares against the gross value of the bonus invested; and
  • Matching Shares attract dividends during the three-year deferral period, released on vesting of any Matching Shares.
  • 2008 awards:
    • the executive directors will be invited to acquire shares (Investment Shares) by deferring part or all of their 2007 net annual bonus into the SMP; and
    • match and performance condition: nil match for actual EPS growth of 5% pa or less, increasing uniformly to a 1:1 match for 8% pa growth.
  • 2009 awards:
    • the UK-based executive directors are required to invest one-quarter of their 2008 net bonus into the SMP and the US-based executive director one-third;
    • maximum level of investment will be 50% of the net annual bonus; and
    • match and performance condition: the match will be extended from a 1:1 match at 8% pa actual EPS growth, increasing uniformly to a 2:1 match at 11% pa growth*.
  • rationale for performance measure: major investors consider EPS to be a key indicator of long-term financial performance and value creation.

* the increase in the match in 2009 is subject to shareholder approval at the May 2008 AGM


Share Incentive Plan (SIP)

During 2007 the UK executive directors were eligible to participate in the all-employee free shares element of the Share Incentive Plan. As a result of the Company’s performance in 2007, all eligible employees (including the UK executive directors) will be entitled to receive shares worth £436. A similar arrangement operates for non-UK employees on a cash or shares basis depending on local tax and security laws.

The Company operates a share purchase arrangement (Partnership Shares) under the Share Incentive Plan which replaced the SAYE Share Option Scheme in 2005. Under this arrangement, UK-based employees (including executive directors) may purchase ordinary shares in BAE Systems by either monthly investments of between £10 and £125 a month, or lump sum investments of between £10 and £1,500 in a tax year, both limited to 10% of salary if less. The Partnership Shares attract Matching Shares. As the plan is an all-employee plan, the Matching Shares are not subject to performance conditions in accordance with legislation. Prior to August 2007, one free Matching Share was awarded for every two Partnership Shares purchased by the employee, up to a maximum monthly Partnership Share investment of £30. From August 2007, one free matching share is awarded for each Partnership Share up to a maximum of £63 per month.

Dividends paid in respect of the shares in the Share Incentive Plan for UK-based employees are reinvested as Dividend Shares.

Dilution of share capital

The Committee has agreed that, in respect of new issue or treasury shares, shares representing no more than 1% of the Company’s issued share capital will be used in any one financial year for the grant of share-based reward in total and an annual limit of 0.5% for executive share-based reward. The table below sets out the available dilution capacity for the Company’s employee share schemes based on the limits set out in the rules of those schemes.
2007
Total issued share capital as at 31 December 2007 3,574m
All schemes:
10% in any consecutive 10 years 357.4m
Remaining headroom 245.0m
Executive schemes:
5% in any consecutive 10 years 178.7m
Remaining headroom 111.7m

The number of ordinary shares in issue at 31 December 2007 was 3,574,509,017 and the number of shares granted under option during 2007 totalled 6,160,572 (0.17% of the total shares in issue). With the changes in remuneration policy as set out above, the Company intends to use new issue shares to satisfy future share awards under the executive long-term incentive plans within the 0.5% annual dilution limit.

Personal shareholding policy

The Committee has agreed a policy whereby all executive directors are required to establish and maintain a minimum personal shareholding equal to 200% of base salary. As a minimum, a holding equal to 100% of base salary must be achieved as quickly as possible using shares vesting or options exercised through the executive share option schemes or long-term incentive schemes, by using 50% of the shares that vest or 50% of the options which are exercised on each occasion. Thereafter, executive directors are required to increase their personal shareholding gradually, on each occasion using 25% of the shares that vest or 25% of the options exercised each year, until a personal shareholding equal to 200% of annual base salary is achieved and maintained. These limits are reviewed periodically. A similar arrangement applies to senior executives eligible for share-based long-term incentives with limits aligned to the levels of awards made under these plans.

Details of the directors’ personal shareholdings are shown in Table A on Directors' interests page.


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